CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW
OF PRICE CONTROL
William C. Burtt and William F. Kennedy I
Price control pervades virtually the entire economy. When the
Defense Production Act is up for renewal, all the forces that mold
Congressional action are focused on the Congressional review of the activities of the Office of Price Stabilization. The renewal of price control legislation, therefore, presents an exceptional opportunity to study
Congressional review and to appraise its effectiveness.
No one who has worked for an administrative agency can doubt
of Congressional review. Throughout the Government genvalue
the
erally, many an indefensible agency action has been stillborn because
of the realization that all agency action faces the possibility of scrutiny
by a Congressional committee. The possibility of a public hearing
before a committee of Congress is not only a protection to all individuals dealing with the agency but leads to sounder standards of
judgment and greater attention to facts in arriving at an agency conclusion. Without such criticism, agency action would become more
arbitrary and the discipline within the agency itself would deteriorate.
Certainly one of the most salutary policies of both the OPS and
the OPA has been that of publishing openly the general standards on
which its actions are based. This publication has been supplemented
by public expressions in statements of considerations supporting a
general price regulation and by the prescription of criteria for individual pricing action. This open door policy not only has been valuable in informing individuals dealing with price control as to their
rights and assuring that all individuals who meet the standards receive the same treatment without discrimination, but it has imposed a
healthy discipline on all the internal activities of the agency. To some
extent this policy was dictated by the requirements of the statute'
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1. The Defense Production Act requires that regulations shall be accompanied
by a statement of considerations involved in the issuance of the regulations. 64 STAT.
803 (1950), 50 U.S.C. Ar'i. §2102(c) (Supp. 1952).
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and by the necessities of judicial review. The policy was also promoted, however, by the knowledge that the activities of the agency
would be subject to examination by Congress.
Congressional review of agency action presents basically the same
questions as judicial review. Both are made necessary by the delegation
of large amounts of discretionary power to administrative agencies.
This delegation in turn was required by the difficulty and complexity
of the problems requiring government action. Underlying both types
of review is the recognition that such large powers have been delegated,
that review is necessary to assure fair and responsible agency action.
It is true that the scope of judicial review has its analogy in long
established legal practice 2 and its procedures are based on the traditional legal disciplines. Congressional review, on the other hand, has
its origins in the political traditions of the legislature, whose primary
function is to reconcile and compromise conflicting political interests.
Its procedures are devised to cope with the problems of balancing diverse political interests. While the court's primary concern is that an
agency act within the framework of delegated power, the legislature is
concerned with the more basic question of how much power should be
delegated. For these reasons the issues are viewed in a different frame
of reference. But the fundamental problem is the same. In both cases
there is the basic question of maintaining the proper relationship between the common-sense generalized knowledge of experienced nonexperts and the technical knowledge of experts which is necessary
to the intelligent handling of the complex problems faced by modern
government.
The modern government administrator is supported by expert
staffs which have accumulated experience and judgment in dealing
with particular problems. But sound government cannot give the final
decision on policy to experts no matter how much they know. The
experts are not elected or sensitive to the demands of the people. Moreover all government, including the courts, depends upon the sound common sense derived from general experience of persons not technically
expert in the field in which they pass judgment. The basic decisions
of government depend not upon expert knowledge but upon the sound
judgment and insight of men of broad experience.
The fact that the control of basic governmental policy must be
in nontechnical hands makes it important that, within the basic
policies, sufficient discretion be vested in an agency with technical
competence to do an intelligent job. The courts have recognized that
2. Judicial review of administrative actiori is, of course, analogous to judicial review of jury verdicts. See discussion in DAvis, ADMINISTRA=T~v LAW 877-8 (1951).
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they have neither the staff nor the facilities to do the job of the administrative agencies. Consequently, most courts have limited their
function to the correction of actions which are clearly wrong, either
because they are arbitrary or discriminatory or because they are unsupported by facts, and to cases where the procedure of the administrative agency is unfair to the participants.' They have hoped through
general guidance to impose upon administrative agencies fair procedures, standards of factual determination, and freedom from discrimination which will protect persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the agency.
At least in its review of price control legislation, Congress, unlike the courts, made no effort to maintain a balance between the job
of the non-expert reviewer and the expert administrator.4 It did not
confine itself to resolving the general political problems raised by price
control. It decided the most detailed ' and technical questions. In
amendments to price control legislation, even basic ones, technical
knowledge is important. Simple amendments designed for small situations often have large implications which cannot be understood with3. NLRB v. Columbia Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). Of course, the actual extent of review and the degree of discretion allowed in a particular case vary widely
among courts even if the same principle is applied. See Stason, Substantial Evidence
in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1026 (1941). Congress, in prescribing
standards of judicial review of price control action, has been careful to preserve
a wide area of discretion in the agency. 56 STAT. 31 (1942), 50 U.S.C. ArP. § 924
(1946); 64 STAT. 808 (1950); 50 U.S.C. App. § 2108(b) (Supp. 1952); 66 STAT.
302 (1952).
4. "Technology has created problems which cannot be solved by political standards
alone, by the balancing of the interests of various groups and arriving at some sort
of synthesis. The social consequences of technology demand the use of experts, both
as administrators and as over-all co-ordinators. . . . Does it mean that the technicians . . . will spin plans for the government, remaining impervious to political
responsibility by hiding behind the stone walls of the Civil Service? .... .. the
political expert has a broader grasp of the whole picture and . . . is mote alert to
the necessary political adjustments which must be made. . . . Congress should
concentrate its attention on the broad political questions . . . it should study them
and mediate on them, and so far as possible, turn over the duties which are not
so time-consuming to the bureaucracy and to its own staff." YOUNG, TinS Is
CoNGRass 24-7 (1946). See also CongressionalOversight of Administrative Agencies,
5 N.Y.B.A. PEc. 11 (1950).
5. In 1952, for example, Congress eliminated imaginary restrictions on kosher
slaughter, 66 STAT. 296 (1952) ; defined the method of fixing prices for processing
retailers of food, 66 STAT. 298 (1952) ; determined that a sale of fertilizer to a farmer
was a sale at retail under the General Ceiling Price Regulation, 66 STAT. 298 (1952) ;
exempted charges for the use of washroom and toilet facilities and bowling alleys,
66 STAT. 299 (1952); limited the intervention of OPS in rate cases, 66 STAT. 299
(1952); exempted charges for state and local governments, 66 STAT. 299 (1952);
and determined the method of fixing ceiling prices for hotel supply houses and
wholesalers affiliated with meat slaughterers, 66 STAT. 300 (1952). Amendments of
this type present the most obvious kind of legislation for lobbies. Moreover, clearly
these are not the kind of issues with which Congress can effectively deal. The
demands on the time of Congressmen are so great in any event that such time as
they are able to devote to price control should be confined to the bigger issues.
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out a technical knowledge of the problem. Many general amendments
have common-sense appeal but will make a practical hash of price control. It takes expertness to understand the implications of the amendments.6 Congress acted upon many of these either without consulting
or against the advice of those most familiar with the problems.
The problem is accentuated because Congressional procedures do
not provide for the systematic presentation of facts and argument necessary for the proper resolution of the more technical problems. The
lack of facilities, the influence of pressure groups, the conflict between
the executive and the legislature and the lack of party responsibility
have in many instances prevented a careful, critical, and fair appraisal
of administrative operations. This is not to say that the regulatory
activities of the OPS were above criticism or that the OPS took full
advantage of its opportunities in its dealings with Congress. Unquestionably the OPS made many mistakes in developing its price control
program and in its Congressional relations. However, an appraisal of
the activities of the OPS is not the subject of this article. We are here
concerned only with an appraisal of Congressional activities in reviewing the activities of the OPS.
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

Committee Procedure.-Congressional committees do not have
the time and facilities to understand fully the operations of an administrative agency despite the fact that they work long and hard.
While the members of these committees absorb a general familiarity
with price control problems, they have so many responsibilities and
duties that they cannot spend the time necessary to attain technical
competence.
Nor are the committee hearing procedures designed to produce a
systematic analysis of the problems.' The committee primarily hears
testimony from citizens who believe that they have been unfairly injured by the price control agency.' Most of this testimony is ex6. See discussion of the Capehart, Butler-Hope and Herlong Amendments, infra.
7. Considering the antagonism that exists between the executive and legislative
branches, the Banking and Currency Committees exhibit remarkable courtesy in the
examination of executive witnesses. It is true that some Congressmen enjoy the
role of inquisitor. It is true that the opposition party is more animated in the
attack than is the majority party in the defense. These things are to be expected.
On balance, the courtesy is remarkable, particularly in view of the fact that no
Congressional leader can continue to enjoy prestige among his colleagues if he says
too many good things about bureaucrats.
8. While the committees are seeking information from witnesses, certainly one
of the purposes of the hearings is to clear the air by letting witnesses blow off
steam.
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tremely partisan and super critical.9 The administrator, on the other
hand, stung by irresponsible attack, mobilizes all his resources to
present expert testimony proving that everything the agency did was
right. The hearing procedures thus tend to produce extreme and undisciplined attacks on price control answered by dogmatic defenses
bolstered by all the facilities of the price control agency. There is
no systematic presentation of facts and argument such as characterizes
court procedures.
To some extent the deficiencies in the hearing procedure are overcome by staff work on the part of the professional staff attached to
the committees. These staff members present to the committee summaries of many of the issues and evidence presented by the hearings.
Despite the efforts and the competence of the staff, the effectiveness of
their work is limited by the fact that the staff is too small to
analyze completely the many issues and facts involved and that committee members are too busy to absorb even a summary staff presentation.
Procedure on the Floor.-On the floor of the House and Senate
there is also little chance for analysis of details of the agency operations and for the appraisal of special amendments. Passage of important legislation free from amendment is dependent not upon traditions of party responsibility or acceptance of the work of relatively
expert committees, but on the personal prestige of the chairman and
the members of the committee and upon their capacity to negotiate
and to deal with the members of their chamber. Such negotiation is
easier in the Senate because the smaller number of members makes
possible closer working relationships among the members themselves.
Thus, Senator Maybank, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, has been able by and large to control the destinies
of the price control bills reported out by his Committee on the floor of
the Senate and the scope of the amendments proposed on the floor. It
9. Thus a representative of the Independent Petroleum Association of America
charged that "one of the basic purposes of the Act-namely, the expansion of productive capacity of vital defense materials [crude oil]-is being ignored and even defeated through the application of the price control authority granted by the Congress."
Hearings before the Houe Committee on Banking and Currency on. H.R. 6546,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 718 (1952).
The facts were that: (1) in 1951, under price control a record addition was
made to petroleum reserves; (2) at the end of 1951 known crude oil reserves were
the highest in history; (3) despite shortages of steel and drilling equipment, a record
number of new wells were drilled in 1951; (4) indications are that the number
of new wells drilled in 1952 will exceed the number drilled in 1951; (5) all demands
for crude petroleum are now being met and we are producing at substantially less
than capacity; (6) stores of crude oil above ground increased beyond expectations
in 1951 and have further increased in 1952; and (7) profits in the petroleum industry
even after taxes had probably never been higher. Ibid 1501.

338

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

is not party leadership, but the personal prestige of Senator Maybank
that has made this possible.
Since the House is a larger body, party discipline is at a minimum.
It is virtually impossible for a committee chairman to reach agreement
with all the members of the House prior to introduction of the bill on
the floor. The result has been that after the House Banking and Currency Committee introduced its 1952 extension bill under an open rule,
a total of 37 amendments were offered on the floor itself. Many of
these amendments were superficially appealing, but actually inconsistent with the purposes of the bill itself. The House passed the bill
with 22 amendments. For all practical purposes, these amendments
destroyed price control.' ° Such important and difficult amendments
as the Herlong and Harrison amendments were floor amendments."
Congress, of course, has a right to end price control at any time
it sees fit. But the important point is that, in debate of amendments
on the floor of the House, the average Congressman has no opportunity
to be educated as to the nature of the amendment or its effect on price
control. Debate is limited by the five minute rule, and most members
of the Congress are not present when the debate is taking place. Individual Congressmen cannot vote on the basis of an intelligent appraisal of whether a particular amendment is right or wrong because
the facts are not available to them.
Moreover, Congressmen on the floor of the House are peculiarly
vulnerable to pressure groups. Where a Congressman can vote for
a whole bill, even if it contains features opposed by particular constituents, he can tell his constituents that he had to vote for the whole
bill even though the particular feature was in it. When, however, a
bill is open to detailed floor amendment with a record vote, a Congressman has to stand up and be counted on a particular amendment which
particular constituents want. The result in the absence of party or
strong personal leadership from the chairman of the committee is a
lobbyist's field day.
The Conference Committee.-The Conference Committee, sellected in the instance of price control from members of the House and
Senate Banking and Currency Committees, is usually composed of the
most influential members of both houses of Congress in the field of
the legislation being considered. It, therefore, can be an active force
10. For example, the House passed the Talle Amendment, later deleted by the
Conference, which would have limited price control to materials under allocation.
98 Cong. Rec. 8345 (June 26, 1952). This amendment would have ended virtually
all controls. Only a few basic metals were under allocation. All consumer goods
and all food would have been freed from control.
11. See discussion, p. 358 and pp. 351, 364 infra.
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in the development of a better law. The members are likely to be of
conservative temperament because seniority plays an important role
in the selection of the membership of the committee. Senior Republicans are likely to come from the most conservative districts where
they are able to survive Democratic landslides. Senior Democrats
are likely to belong to the more conservative Southern wing of the
party. Under strong leadership, as in 1952, the Conference Committee has an opportunity to eliminate ill-considered amendments
adopted during the floor debate. But the Conference also presents a
chance to incorporate into the final bill amendments designed to compromise differences between the two chambers. These compromises,
it is true, must be within the general framework of the bill as passed
by the two Houses. Within this framework there is considerable opportunity to make radical changes in the law which not only are generally hastily prepared, but which have never been discussed or considered in the House or Senate committees or on the floor. The unfortunate third sentence of the Capehart amendment owes its birth
to just such a compromise. 2
THE EFFECT ON CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN
THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE AND THE LACK OF PARTY
RESPONSIBILITY

There are substantial differences between the influences that elect
a President and those that elect legislators. This is a country with
large and varied local interests. Both local and national considerations
influence the election of the President and the legislators. The President, however, generally owes his election more to a national political
organization and to his sensitivity to national problems. Legislators
more often owe their election more to local political organizations and
to their sensitivity to local problems. 3
12. See discussion p. 344 infra.
13. "The structure of the American party system and its manifestation in Congress accentuate the strains on the American legislator. He is very much on his
own. The national party does not arrange his candidacy; it has little control over
the machine on which the congressman depends for his re-election; and its financial
aid for the conduct of his campaign is much less than adequate. He must keep his
machine going. Like an ambassador who is uneasy that his enemies at home are
undoing his work and undermining his position while he is away, the legislator must
always keep his eye on the machine at home-fearing that it might break out of his
control during his absence in Washington.
"American constituents, at least a sector of them, are often very outspoken in
their demands. The American legislator is moreover hypersensitive to the faintest
whisper of a constituent's voice. Unable to depend on the national party for reelection, he must cultivate and nurture his constituency more than legislators in other
democratic countries where constituents are less clamorous and parties are stronger
at the center." Shils, The Legislator and His Environment, U. op CHI. L. RLv. 572
(1951). See also HYNEMA, BuRAucRAcy IN A DzmocAcy 160 (1950).
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This situation has two results that profoundly affect the nature
of our government. First, there is apt to be a split between the executive and legislative branches of the government. The President's
policy is apt to be dominated by his allegiance to national groups and
his conception of the national interest. Congressional policy is apt
to be dominated by the influence of a cumulation of diverse local groups.
Second, there is no party policy supported by both branches of the
government and backed by party discipline. On many issues, including many aspects of price control, the alliance of conservative Southern
Democrats and Republicans has been stronger than the majority of
the Democratic Party in Congress." Moreover, the divergence of
local interests in this large country are too great to permit agreement
on a firm national policy backed by party discipline. 5
It may be argued the Congressional processes of reconciling diverse local interests leads to a more acceptable and workable resolution
of national problems. It may be argued on the other hand that the
local influences in Congress are so strong that they prevent the government from dealing effectively with important national problems.'
Certainly in price control the split between the two branches of government and the lack of party responsibility has had unfortunate results. It has meant that Congress did not have complete access to the
14. The Southern Democrats in the Senate generally support a strong price
control. In the House, while many Southern Democrats supported price control,
many also opposed it. The key vote in the Senate was on the Dirksen Amendment,
which would have eliminated price control from the Defense Production Act. Of
the 28 Senators from southern and border states only one voted for the amendment,
24 voted against it and three did not vote. 98 Cong. Rec. 63333-34 (May k29, 1952).
The picture in the House was different. It is illustrated by the Barden Amendment
which would have ended price controls on July 31, 1952. Not only was the amendment proposed by a Southern Congressman but out of 125 representatives from
southern and border states 36, over one-fourth, voted for it. Sixty-six members
voted against it and 23 did not vote. 98 Cong. Rec. 8348-49 (June 26, 1952).
15. The American Political Science Association established a Committee on
Political Parties which studied this problem for four years. It concluded as follows:
". .. Historical and other factors have caused the American two-party system to
operate as two loose associations of state and local organizations, with very little
national machinery and very little national cohesion. As a result, either major party,
when in power, is ill-equipped to organize its members in the legislative and the
executive branches into a government held together and guided by the party program. Party responsibility at the polls thus tends to vanish. This is a very serious
matter, for it affects the very heartbeat of American democracy. It also poses grave
problems of domestic and foreign policy in an era when it is no longer safe for the
nation to deal piecemeal with issues that can be disposed of only on the basis of coherent programs." Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 Am. Potk
Scr. REv. (Supp. 1951).
16. "Now that the nation is crowded, harassed by weighty social and economic
problems, and deeply involved in world affairs, better teamwork between the legislative and executive segments of government is essential to the welfare and security
of the American people, and perhaps to the survival of the democratic system. ...
President Franklin D. Roosevelt summarized the situation when he said: 'The letter
of the Constitution wisely declared a separation, but the impulse of common purposes
declares a union."' KEFAUVER & L=N, A TWENITH-CENTURY CoNGa-ss 66
(1947).
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vast body of knowledge, experience and insight accumulated by the
executive department in administering the lawsY It also has led to a
strengthening of the influence of pressure groups, not strong enough to
influence national policy, but strong enough to apply local pressures
on enough Congressmen to secure special amendments that substantially diminished the effectiveness of price control.
The Role of Pressure Groups.-The role of the Congressman dealing with price control legislation is not a happy one. He is besieged
by delegations from industries affected by price regulations; he receives telegrams and letters from scores of influential constituents; he
is under constant, relentless and unceasing pressure to protect the interests of particular constituents within his Congressional district. On
the other hand, he receives little pressure to vote in favor of price
control except that he realizes that it will be a general issue in any
18
campaign in which he engages.
Lobbies exert their influence, not only because they represent
groups whose members vote in a Congres~man's district, but also because they contribute to Congressional campaign funds. It takes big
money to be elected to Congress today and the money comes largely
from people who want something special for their money. If any one
thing would diminish the power of pressure groups, it would be to relieve those seeking political office from the necessity of obtaining funds
from those groups. Here again the problem is easy to see, but hard to
answer. The payment of some campaign funds by the government, or
the raising of party funds by many small contributions instead of a few
large ones, could do something to free Congressmen from financial
obligations to big contributors."9
17. Congress does have some access to administrative expertise. Traditionally,
after bills are introduced they are referred through the Bureau of the Budget to
the appropriate executive agency for comment. There is often consultation between
executive and congressional staff members. Committees receive reports and hold
hearings to get the facts. However, antagonism and differences in objective tend
to color the presentation of facts to Congress and to limit their acceptance by
Congressmen.
18. For an excellent discussion of the role of pressure groups in government
today, see TRUMAN, THE GOVERNmENTAL PROCESS (1951),
ON TRIAL c. 2 (1949).

and BURNS, CONGRESS

19. In 1951 the Douglas Committee, investigating ethics in government, gave
considerable study to this problem. The committee's report stated as follows:
"Conscientious candidates face the dilemma of accepting disproportionate contributions from particular groups (with corresponding obligations) or of not having
enough money to make a good fight."
"Persuasive testimony has been received arguing that direct public support for
political campaigns is desirable. . . . Since ownership of the airways is vested in
the public, it is argued, radio and television licensees should be required to make
time available for discussion at stated periods during campaigns. . . . Another
possibility is to give the franldng privilege to candidates. A third, more radical,
proposal-although it is not new-is to pay from public funds to meet campaign

342

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

The significant thing in watching pressure groups work on Congress is not that they are so successful but that Congressmen so often
resist the efforts of these groups to write their own definitions of the
public interest into the law. Actually on the broad general question
as to whether there will or will not be price control, the lobbies have
very little influence. Congressmen usually recognize that this is a
general political question on which they are answerable to all their
constituents.
Lobby and pressure groups are a part of the democratic process.
They are one way in which Congress gets informed. But these lobby
and pressure groups represent only a limited portion of all the interests, organized and unorganized, in the country. Lobbies are highly
effective in securing the passage of amendments, which by making price
control painless for a particular group also make it either ineffective
or administratively unworkable in broad areas. The cumulative effect
of these amendments may destroy the substance of the bill itself. The
Herlong, Fugate, Butler-Hope and Bricker Amendments," which left
wide gaps in price control legislation, were all the result of effective
lobbies.
THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF

1950

However much general criticism could be directed at Congressional procedures, the final test is how well Congress does the job. In
dealing with price control legislation, that judgment requires a more
detailed analysis of the major problems faced by the OPS and by the
Congress and an appraisal of how well Congress has handled the
specific problems it faced.
Despite some deficiencies, the Defense Production Act of 1950
was generally regarded as a workable law. The basic criteria for the
establishment of ceilings were the same as those prescribed in the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, under which the Office of Price
Administration had been able to run an effective program. 1
The failure to impose a general freeze immediately after the enactment of the Defense Production Act in September 1950, or at least
after the Chinese intervention in Korea in November, must be charcosts of candidates or parties." Ethical Standards in Goverinet, Report of the
Subcommittee of the Senate Commnittee on Labor and Public Welfare 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 63 (1951).
The efforts of Beardsley Ruml, in the 1952 campaign, to raise funds by small
contributions from many contributors is a step in the right direction, though there
can be no question that the campaign was primarily financed through the usual large
contributions.
20. See pp. 355, 358, 365.
21. Field, Economic Stabilization Under the Defense Production Act of 1950- 64

HIAv. L. REv. 1 (1950).
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acterized in retrospect as a very serious mistake.22 When finally the
General Ceiling Price Regulation (the "freeze") ' was issued on January 26, 1951, the Office of Price Stabilization was immediately faced
with some grave problems.
Price relationships in the American economy are as delicate as
they are complex. The technique of the GCPR-freezing the prices of
every individual seller in the country at the highest price at which he
made deliveries in the period December 19, 1950-January 25, 1951
-was the only means available to stop a runaway of prices. But the
unavoidable result of the freeze was the perpetuation of a price structure
which was badly out of balance.
First,prices of raw materials and prices at the manufacturing and
processing levels are much more sensitive and fluctuate much more
rapidly than prices at subsequent levels of distribution. The impact
of the post-Korean inflation (which was largely psychological in origin)
was felt more sharply at the wholesale level than at retail. The Wholesale Price Index between June 15, 1950, and January 15, 1951, increased about 15 percent while the Consumer Price Index increased
only 6.6 percent.24 In other words, prices at wholesale rose 2Y2 times
faster than prices at retail.
Obviously retail prices had lagged behind wholesale prices and
a normal relationship between wholesale and retail price levels could
be restored only by raising retail ceilings or lowering wholesale ceilings. Retailers had to be allowed their normal margins over wholesale
costs, and these normal margins could be preserved only by lowering
those wholesale costs, or by raising retail prices.
Second, there were cases where, within a given industry, some
sellers had complied with the government's request to hold the line
made in December, 1950, and had either absorbed cost-increases without increasing prices or had at least not increased prices faster than
their costs had increased. Others had charged all the traffic would
bear. These sellers, the patriotic and the less patriotic, all had their
prices frozen indiscriminately. It was obviously inequitable to penalize
sellers for their patriotic conduct by allowing higher ceilings to their
less responsible competitors.
22. Ginsburg, Price Stabilization, 1950-2: Retrospect and Prospect, 100 U.
PA. L. REv. 514 (1952).
23. 16 FED. REG. 808 (1951).

OF

24. The BLS Wholesale Price Index on June 15, 1950, was at 100.2
(1947-9=100). On January 15, 1951 it was at 115. The BLS Consumer Price
Index was at 170.2 on June 15, 1950, and at 181.5 on January 15, 1951 (1935-9=
100).
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Third, prices of some commodities had risen more rapidly than
the prices of other commodities, or of wages, to which they bore a
certain normal relationship. This was important for two reasons.
Every price in the economy is someone else's cost. If the price of
aluminum increases, for example, the manufacturer of housewares must
either raise his prices or suffer a contraction of margins. There were
many instances where the prices of materials, either raw or manufactured, rose faster than the prices of commodities made from those
materials. Similarly, every retail price is a wage-earner's cost. Thus,
the sharp rise in the price of beef, a major cost of living item, naturally
increased pressure for higher wages. Distortion of normal price relationships was also important because there might be diversion of
supplies or production to more profitable channels where higher ceilings were obtainable.
It was obvious' that any system of price control to be equitable
or even tenable had to be based on a rectification of these distortions
and a restoration of more normal relationships. To have corrected
all the distortions by means of increasing the unduly low ceilings
would have been inflationary. Stabilization of prices would have occurred at unduly high levels. The only alternative was a series of
limited rollbacks.
This program of limited rollbacks presented the major issue in
the 1951 fight over extension of the price control legislation. The
easing of inflationary pressures in many commodity areas subsequent
to the enactment of the 1951 amendments makes the bitter contest over
some of those amendments seem in retrospect a little academic. But
in appraising the Congressional approach to price control problems it
is necessary to put ourselves in the context of May, June and July,
1951. At that time the upward movement of the Wholesale Price
Index had been halted and even slightly reversed. But wholesale prices
generally were still 14 to 15 percent higher than they were before
Korea. 5 Moreover, retail prices were some 9 percent higher than
before Korea, and were continuing to rise.2 6 There was widespread
expectation in Congress and everywhere else of continued inflationary
pressure. Hence, the limitations on the effectiveness of the price
control authority imposed in 1951 cannot be explained in terms of a
conviction that price controls were not needed.
25. The Wholesale Price Index reached a high of 116.5 in February.
at 115.9 in May, 115.1 in June, and 114.2 in July.

It was

26. The Consumer Price Index was at 183.3 in February, 185.4 in May, 185.2 in
June, and 185.5 in July.
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AMENDMENTS

The Capehart Amendment.-The OPS made two serious efforts
to straighten out, at least to a limited degree, the badly distorted situation created by the freeze. The first was in the field of manufactured
commodities generally, the second related to beef.
The Capehart Amendment grew out of Ceiling Price Regulation
22, the General Manufacturers Regulation. 7 CPR 22 was designed
to supersede the freeze imposed by the General Ceiling Price Regulation for most manufactured items. Its plan was simple. It continued
the GCPR system of establishing separate ceilings for each individual
seller. Ceiling prices were to be recalculated for manufactured products by adjusting pre-Korean prices for increases in manufacturing
labor and material costs occurring after Korea.
The theory of CPR 22 was clear. To begin with, it was to be
only an interim measure. Its purpose was to relieve those manufacturers whose margins were squeezed as a result of the general freeze
and also to roll back the ceilings of those manufacturers who had increased selling prices more than was warranted by the increase in costs.
Just as CPR 22 replaced the freeze, so it too was to be replaced by
more suitable regulations, particularly dollars and cents regulations,
tailored to the situations in particular industries.
Under CPR 22 there was to be as nearly as possible a restoration
of pre-Korean price relationships between sellers and of pre-Korean
cost-price relationships for an individual seller. To that end sellers
would be compelled to go back to pre-Korean prices as a starting
point in computing ceilings. An adjustment would be granted, however, for labor and material costs since all wage increases and many
material cost increases could not, as a practical matter, be undone.
Overhead cost increases would, on the other hand, not be recognized
because of the difficulty of assigning those cost increases to individual
products and because it was anticipated that they could be absorbed
by expanding volume.
Where manufacturers had heeded governmental admonitions to
hold the line and costs had increased faster than prices, CPR 22 was
bound to result in price increases. Where, however, prices had moved
up faster than costs, CPR 22 would result in rollbacks. Once CPR 22
had served to straighten out the ceiling price structure, it would be
feasible to impose on a reasonable basis dollars and cents ceilings or
other more tailored treatment in particular industries.
Ceiling Price Regulation 30, Machinery and
27. 16 FED. REG. 3562 (1951).
Related Manufactured Goods, 16 FED. REG. 4108 (1951) was a comparable regulation
applicable to machinery.
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It must be conceded that experience under CPR 22 proved it to
be a far from satisfactory regulation. There were a number of things
wrong with it.
First, it continued the system of individual pricing used under
the freeze. This made enforcement difficult.. Also it established different ceilings for sellers of the same item who in a normal economy
frequently sold at the same price.
Second, the regulation led to unreasonably high ceilings in many
cases. This was because several optional methods of calculating ceilings were prescribed to take care of industries characterized by seasonal
fluctuations and to provide for the variety of cost accounting systems
used by manufacturers. Large manufacturers, of course, made each
of the optional calculations and used the one yielding the highest ceiling.
Third, the determination of ceilings required a complex series of
calculations. This complexity made compliance with the regulation
burdensome for small companies. It also made evasion of the regulation much harder to detect.
Fourth, the regulation with its complex calculation and filing requirements so burdened the agency's staff that they were not able to
devote their energies to the development of tailored regulations for
particular industries.
It is possible that CPR 22 was the only device which could have
been used at the time to correct even partially the many distortions resulting from the freeze, but it is obvious from the foregoing that the
regulation had many deficiencies. But whatever its merits as an instrument of price control, CPR 22 would have resulted in rollbacks for
an appreciable number of manufacturers, including some large ones.
Some of these companies complained bitterly to Congress. Congress
heeded the complaints, rebuked the Administration for its mistake in
failing to impose controls earlier and then proceeded to compound
the mistake in the Capehart Amendment.
The Capehart Amendment, section 402 (d) (4) of the Defense
Production Act, read as follows:
"After the enactment of this paragraph no ceiling price on
any material (other than an agricultural commodity) or on any
service shall become effective which is below the lower of (A)
the price prevailing just before the date of issuance of the regulation or order establishing such ceiling price, or (B) the price
prevailing during the period January 25, 1951, to February 24,
1951, inclusive. Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the
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establishment or maintenance of a ceiling price with respect to any
material (other than an agricultural commodity) or service which
(1) is based upon the highest price between January 1, 1950,
and June 24, 1950, inclusive, if such ceiling price reflects adjustments for increases or decreases in costs occurring subsequent
to the date on which such highest price was received and prior to
July 26, 1951, or (2) is established under a regulation issued prior
to the enactment of this paragraph. Upon application and a
proper showing of his prices and costs by any person subject to
a ceiling price, the President shall adjust such ceiling price in
the manner prescribed in clause (1) of the preceding sentence.
For the purposes of this paragraph the term "costs" includes material, indirect and direct labor, factory, selling, advertising, office,
and all other production, distribution, transportation and administration costs, except such as the President may determine to be unreasonable and excessive." 28
It will be seen that the first sentence, in effect, prevented rollbacks below the level of the prices prevailing after the freeze unless
the market had fallen subsequently, in which case a regulation could
follow the market down. The second sentence preserved existing regulations and also permitted OPS to go below freeze levels or even below
current market levels if the ceiling was equal to the highest pre-Korean
price plus all cost increases occurring between the pre-Korean period
and July 26, 1951 (the date when the Senate and House conferees
agreed to the amendment). The third sentence entitled each individual seller to an adjustment of his ceiling on individual application so that it would be equivalent to his highest pre-Korean price plus
all cost increases up to July 26, 1951. The individual adjustment
clause of the third sentence contained, of course, no saving clause
preserving existing ceilings.
The Capehart Amendment presented to the Congress two of the
most basic of price control issues: (1) the extent to which sellers should
be required to absorb cost increases without increases in ceilings; (2)
whether an individual seller should be subjected to ceilings which, although fair and equitable to most members of a class, nevertheless work
a hardship on that individual seller because, for one reason or another,
his operation is economically less efficient than that of most members
of the class.
28. The amendment was added by § 104(e) of the Defense Production Act
Amendments of 1951, 65 STAT. 135 (1951), 50 U.S.C. Ap,. § 2102(d) (4) (Supp.
1952). Section 107 of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT.
298 (1952), added a sentence excluding from the coverage of the Capehart provisions, wholesalers and retailers covered by the Herlong Amendment. This language
was designed to overrule Safeway Stores, lix. v. Arnall, 196 F.2d 510 (Em. Ct.
App. 1952).
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The OPA in World War II had arrived at a policy on both of
these issues, which OPS adopted. On the question of cost absorption,
OPS rejected the notion that every cost increase should be reflected in
a ceiling price increase. To be sure, the idea of allowing a seller to
recover a cost increase by increasing his ceiling has a certain superficial
appeal. But since every price in the economy is someone else's cost,
it was obvious that unless cost absorption was required at some point
there would be an indefinite escalation of prices, and that it would be
impossible to control prices effectively. The standard for cost absorption worked out by OPA and adopted by OPS was the so-called earnings standard. Increased costs would not be recognized as a basis for
increased ceilings unless and only to the extent that the effect of the increased costs was to depress industry (not individual) earnings below
normal. A normal level of earnings was defined as roughly the excess
profits tax standard-85 percent of the industry earnings for the best
three of the four years 1946-9, adjusted for changes in net worth. 9
OPS like OPA also operated on the theory that it must, wherever
feasible, establish uniform ceilings for all sellers in an industry at a
point which would be fair to the bulk of the sellers in that industry, even
though those ceilings might work hardship on a few high cost sellers.
The reasons for this policy were fairly obvious. Uniform ceilings
were essential to effective enforcement of the regulations. Individual
ceilings for hundreds of thousands of sellers made the task of checking
violations insuperable. To set uniform ceilings at a level high enough
to take care of the highest cost producer would have meant impossibly
high ceilings inconsistent with a serious stabilization program. On the
other hand setting ceilings at a point which covered the bulk of the
sellers in an industry was in effect following the pattern of a normal
economy where the marginal producers, characterized by inefficiency,
had either to improve their operations or withdraw from the competitive struggle.
Both of these decisions are hard ones and neither of them appealed
to Congressmen generally. In rejecting these decisions, Congress
turned 180 degrees the other way and adopted an approach to price
control which can only be characterized as inflationary and as technically wrong.
29. The OPS industry earnings standard was first announced in a letter, dated
April 21, 1951, from Eric Johnston, Administrator of the Economic Stabilization
Agency, to Michael V. DiSalle, Director of the Office of Price Stabilization. It is
spelled out in OPS Price Operations Memorandum No. 25, dated February 15, 1952.
For a discussion of the OPA industry earning standard, see PROBLEMS IN PRICE
CONTROL: PRICING STANDARDS, CH. II, THE INDUSTRY EARNINGS STANDARD, (Office
of Temporary Controls 1947).
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First, the limitations on, in effect prohibitions against, rollbacks
precluded stabilization of prices except at a level much higher than
that which had theretofore been possible. Superficially, for example,
the first sentence of the amendment permitted stabilization of prices at
the GCPR levels. But actually because no ceilings could be established
below GCPR levels, other ceilings would have to be established at
higher than GCPR levels to avoid squeezes and inequities.
Suppose for example, that at the time of the freeze the spread between wholesale and retail prices of widgets was less than normal. Since
wholesale prices could not be rolled back below freeze levels because of
the Capehart Amendment and since other provisions of the law required
maintenance of normal margins, the practical impact of the Capehart
Amendment was to require raising retail prices of widgets above freeze
levels.
Second, CPR 22 had established December 31, 1950 as the cutoff
date beyond which most material cost increases would not be recognized
and March 15, 1951 as the cutoff date for labor cost increases and for
a few material cost increases. The third sentence of the Capehart
Amendment by guaranteeing a seller an automatic pass through of all
cost increases up to July 26, 1951, was bound to continue the upward
movement of prices beyond the point where they reasonably might have
been stabilized.
Third, by guaranteeing each seller an individual price based on
all cost increases, the amendment precluded in many areas the possibility of uniform dollars and cents ceilings. It thus gave to an individual seller in time of shortage an advantage which the competitive
workings of a free market ordinarily denied him-the advantage of
being able to sell at a price higher than that established for a competitor. Moreover, the inability to impose uniform dollars and cents
ceilings made enforceable price control difficult in many areas.
Thus, the system of individual pricing, which OPS had adopted in
the GCPR and CPR 22 as a temporary expedient, was frozen into the
law by the amendment. There was imposed on OPS for all industrial
commodities a system of individual pricing with its corresponding administrative burdens which was, to say the least, impractical.
Fourth, the Capehart Amendment was written on the assumption,
which every accountant knows to be erroneous, that overhead costs
of a multiproduct company can readily be assigned to individual products, and on the further assumption, likewise erroneous, that American
businessmen generally keep the kind of cost records which would per-

350

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

mit such an assignment, even if it were theoretically feasible . 0 The
regulations which OPS eventually adopted to implement the amendment were as a result models of complexity-a complexity which the
statute made unavoidable. 1
The Capehart Amendment was, in sum, inconsistent with workable
price control. The amendment did not lay down any reasonable policy
on cost absorption. And certainly regardless of what policy was followed on cost absorption, it is hard to find a justification for a policy
of mandatory individual pricing.
Moreover, the psychological impact of the Capehart amendment
on subsequent OPS policy was bad. Many high ceilings were not reduced, even though it was legally feasible, because of Congressional
antipathy to rollbacks. Certainly in some of the areas where a suspension policy was followed because prices were below ceilings, it would
have been more suitable to roll back ceilings instead.
The issue presented by the CPR 22 rollbacks was clearly of such
general importance that Congress properly decided that the matter
should be resolved by it rather than by OPS. There can be no quarrel
with the fact that Congress decided the issue but only with the substance
of the decision, for the reasons already indicated, and with the way in
which Congress approached the problem.
No provision like the third sentence of the Capehart Amendment
was ever presented to or discussed by either the Senate or House Banking and Currency Committee or by the full Senate or House. It first
appeared after both the Senate and the House had acted on extension
legislation in post-midnight sessions of the Conference Committee. It
was presented in a situation where the Committee was considering a
long and complex series of amendments and was rushing to get a bill
to the President before the legislation expired. The Committee did not
have the benefit of full consideration and expert advice by its own staff,
because that staff did not have adequate opportunity to look into the
problems presented by the unexpected suggestion presented in the third
sentence of the Capehart Amendment.
The necessity of operating under a deadline not only deprived the
Conference Committee of the opportunity for careful consideration of
the Capehart Amendment but the normal wear and tear of a long and
30. See Statement by Michael V. DiSalle, August 30, 1951, prepared for submission to Senate Banking and Currency Committee, pages 3-4, and Hearings before
Senate Committee on Banking and Currewey on S. 1928, S. 2092, and S. 2104, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2834, 2837 (1951).
31. See Supplementary Regulation 17 to Ceiling Price Regulation 22, 16 FED.
REG. 11484 (1951), Supplementary Regulation 18 to Ceiling Price Regulation 22, 16
REG. 11919 (1951), General Overriding Regulation 20, 16 FaD. REG. 12014
(1951), and General Overriding Regulation 21, 16 FaD. REG. 12310 (1951).

FED.
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hurried session naturally wore down the patience of the Committee
members and produced an atmosphere conducive to the adoption of any
plausible compromise no matter how ill-considered. Moreover, the
OPS proved itself something less than politically astute when by successive postponements it fixed the effective date of the CPR 22 rollbacks on July 2, thus diverting from itself to Congress all the political
heat generated by industry against the rollbacks.
That the Conference might well have rejected the third sentence,
had it been fully aware of its significance, is best indicated by the fact
that in the fall of 1951 both the Senate and House Banking and Currency Committees, after they had adequate opportunity to consider the
matter, reported out favorably bills modifying the Capehart Amendment
by revising the individual adjustment clause and by permitting the
establishment of uniform industry-wide ceilings at the levels prescribed
in the first two sentences of the Capehart Amendment. 3 2
The merits of the first two sentences of the Capehart Amendment,
although they represented a blow to the stabilization program, are at
least arguable. But in any period of acute inflationary pressure, elimination of the third sentence would be essential to effective price control.
The third sentence of the Capehart Amendment was thus an off-the-cuff
disposition of an important and complex problem in a situation where
Congress was compelled to act hastily without expert assistance.
The Fugate Amendment.-The fight over the beef rollbacks involved the same fundamental issue.33 In the period following Korea,
cattle and beef prices had increased much more rapidly than prices generally. Before Korea the average farm price of cattle had been $23.70
per cwt. On January 15, 1951, it was $27.00 per cwt. The freeze
arrested the upward movement of beef prices at wholesale and retail
but a freeze technique would not work for cattle and controls on cattle
were not issued until April 30. By April 15, the average farm price
of cattle had risen to $30.20 per cwt. or 152 percent of parity.
In the period between January 1950 and April 1951 cattle prices
rose five times as much as the wages of manufacturing workers, over
four times as much as the prices paid by farmers, over five times as
32. See SEN. REP. No. 796, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. REP. No. 1186,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). See also, Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currenwy on S. 1928, S. 2092, and S. 2104, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951)
and Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 2170,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The bill modifying the Capehart Amendment, S. 2170,
passed the Senate, but never got out of the House Rules Committee. S. 2170 did
contain a clause requiring relief for individual hardship. However, the principle of
uniform industry-wide pricing was substantially restored.
33. For a full discussion of the OPS position on the cattle rollbacks, see the
Memorandum on the Beef Control Program, June 8, 1951, in Hearings before the
House Comnittee on Banking and Curreiwy on H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
1280 et seq. (1951). The factual material used here is taken from that memorandum.
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much as consumer prices, and over three times as much as the prices of
food items generally.
Cattle prices in turn were, of course, the key to beef prices. The
farmer gets approximately 70 cents of the consumer's beef dollar. Since
margins of packers and retailers do not account for a major portion of
the retail price and since the element of profit in those margins is not
large, even a squeeze on margins would not result in a significant reduction of retail beef prices.
On the other hand the need for a significant reduction of beef
prices in order to restore normal pre-Korean price relationships was
obvious. Moreover, the need was particularly acute because of the importance of beef in the cost of living and because of its psychological
significance in the stabilization program. Beef has a weight of almost
12 percent in the food index of the Consumer's Price Index and a
weight of over 4 percent in the over-all Consumer's Price Index. Moreover, the rapid increase in beef prices after Korea became the very symbol of inflation. Finally there could be no doubt that the increase in
beef prices was an important economic factor and an even more important emotional factor in increasing pressure for wage increases.
The indicated course for the Office of Price Stabilization was,
therefore, to attempt to roll back cattle prices to more normal levels and
to make corresponding reductions of wholesale and retail beef prices.
It is a tribute to Mr. DiSalle's courage that, fully realizing the political
storm which would break over his head, he embarked on a program of
cattle rollbacks.
The rollbacks were to be in three stages.3 4 There was first an
initial rollback of cattle prices to approximately January, 1951, levels,
a reduction of about 10 percent from the April highs. This rollback
was effective one month after the issuance of the regulation. However,
it did not permit a reduction of beef prices. This was because beef
prices had been frozen as of the end of January, 1951, but cattle prices
had not. Between January and April, cattle prices had risen about 10
percent. As a result, the spread between the prices packers paid for
cattle and the prices they could legally charge for beef had been wiped
out. Beef slaughtering operations were being conducted at a loss.
Hence, the initial rollback served only to restore packer margins. Had
it not been placed in effect, margins would have had to be restored
by a further increase in wholesale and retail prices.
A reduction in beef prices was to follow upon the two subsequent
cattle rollbacks to become effective in August and October. These two
34. Ceiling Price Regulation 23, 16 FED.

REG.

3696 (1951).
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subsequent rollbacks amounted in total to an additional 10 percent reduction in cattle prices, and would have made possible a reduction of
retail beef ceilings averaging about 10 cents a pound.
The rollbacks were postponed because feeders had bought cattle
for feeding based on the higher levels prevailing between January and
April. By October substantially all cattle bought prior to announcement
of the rollbacks would be out of the feedlots and the rollbacks could be
put into effect without hardship to feeders. However, to lessen the
impact of the subsequent rollbacks on the market they were to be made
in two steps-half in August and half in October.
The furious attack which followed this action was based really
on one ground only-the unfairness of taking from cattle producers,
both growers and feeders, the high prices which had been reached by
April, 1951. The emotional reaction of the cattle producers was that
OPS bureaucrats were taking from them what was rightfully theirs.
But in all the sound and fury which followed the announcement of
the beef rollbacks there was never a demonstration that the prices which
would prevail after the last rollback were unfair or were insufficient to
encourage production. In the nature of the case there could not be.
Cattle prices after the last rollback would have been more than 120
percent parity. By definition parity represents a fair price to the producer, and parity for beef cattle had been revised substantially upward
pursuant to the Agricultural Act of 1948.3' Moreover, cattle prices
after the last rollback would still have been 25 percent higher than
the January, 1950, price and 7 percent higher than the highest price
which had ever prevailed before Korea.
It is understandable, however, that Congress by the enactment
6
of the Fugate Amendment banned the August and October rollbacks.3
35. The difference made by the change in the parity formula in the parity price
for beef cattle is indicated by the fact that under the new formula the parity price
for beef cattle as of January 15, 1952, was $21.10, whereas under the old formula
it would have been $15.00. See the Parity Handbook, SEN. Doc. No. 129, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
36. The amendment prohibited the beef rollbacks by the device of establishing
an additional legal minimum for agricultural commodities. Until the Fugate Amendment the legal minimum for an agricultural commodity was the higher of the parity
price or the highest price received by producers during the period May 24-June 24,
1950. Under the Fugate Amendment the legal minimum was the higher of the parity
or the May 24-June 24 price or 90 per cent of the price received (by grade) on
May 19, 1951. May 19 was picked because it was the day before the originally
announced effective date of the first beef rollback. The 90 per cent figure was used
to permit the initial 10 per cent rollback to remain effective.
A ceiling for an agricultural commodity may not be lower than the legal minimum.
Ceilings for commodities processed from agricultural commodities must "reflect" that
minimum, that is, they must permit processors to pay the legal minimum for the
agricultural commodity and still realize a fair and equitable margin. The legal

minimum provisions of the Act will be found in § 402(d) (3), 64 STAT. 805 (1950).
The Fugate Amendment was added to § 402(d) (3) by § 104(b) of the Defense
Production Act Amendments of 1951, 65 STAT. 134 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App.
§2102(d) (3)

(Supp. 1952).
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These rollbacks were taking something away from one group in the
population, cattle producers, and giving it to another, consumers.
Whatever the larger considerations of policy and of equity, it was
obviously easier to deny to one group a prospective benefit than to take
from another group a benefit which it had already obtained. That this
was a significant if not dominant factor in the Congressional psychology
is indicated by the fact that in the House of Representatives an attempt to knock out the initial and already effective rollback of cattle
prices to January, 1951, levels was beaten back when it was made clear
that this might mean raising retail beef ceilings another 10 cents a
pound.
It was perhaps asking too much of Congress, given the strength
of the farm bloc, to expect that it would sanction the rollbacks. The
consumer, as a result, paid in higher beef prices for the failure to impose controls promptly in the fall of 1950.
The discussion above of the Capehart Amendment indicates the
difficulty faced by Congress in having to deal with complex economic
issues without time for adequate consideration and without the full
benefit of expert assistance. The Fugate Amendment illustrates another difficulty-the unrelenting pressure placed on Congressmen by
lobbies for particular groups. There can be little doubt as to how the
country would haire voted had the issue of the rollbacks been submitted
to a popular referendum. Likewise, for the reasons stated above, there
could be little serious challenge to the fairness of the beef rollbacks. Yet
the beef rollbacks were voted down in both the Senate and the House
by very substantial margins.
The votes on the beef rollbacks demonstrate once again the validity of an old truism about the legislative process, namely, that on
occasion neither the merits of the case nor an unarticulated popular
preference will prevail against the organized pressure of powerful
lobbies. The cattlemen's lobbies were able in the fight on the beef
rollbacks to enlist the aid of the larger farm organizations. As a result the beef rollbacks became a farm bloc issue. Accordingly, for
example, many Southern Congressmen, coming from states where their
constituents were consumers rather than producers of beef, voted
against the rollbacks because of the tacit alliance of all farm state (in37
cluding cotton state) Congressmen on issues involving farm prices.
37. The power of the farm bloc in Congress is disproportionate to the number
of farmers in the country as a whole because of the equal representation of each
state in the Senate and because state legislatures, usually dominated by rural legislators have given less weight to urban than to rural areas in establishing Congressional districts.
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The Butler-Hope Amendment.-The beef rollbacks presented a
relatively simple problem and the disposition of it, even though unsatisfactory from the point of view of price control, was nevertheless
an understandable balancing by Congress in the light of the psychological realities, of the conflicting interests of farmers and consumers.
The Congressional banning of slaughter quotas was, however,
a much less defensible decision because it was based on a lack of understanding of the problem-a lack of understanding for which the staff
of OPS must bear some share of the responsibility because they never
succeeded in explaining clearly and effectively the need for quotas.
The slaughter quota system had been used on an on-and-off basis
in the latter stages of OPA.3
It was the first meat control imposed
by the Office of Price Stabilization.3 9 It was issued two weeks after
the general freeze and almost three months before the issuance of
dollars-and-cents ceilings on cattle and beef."
The basic features of the slaughter quota system were simple.
In general each slaughterer was limited to the slaughter of the same
proportion of the total available supply of a species of livestock (cattle,
hogs, calves or lambs) which he had slaughtered during 1950. This
limitation was accomplished by quotas established monthly. A
slaughterer's quota in a given month was a stated percentage, more or
less than 100, of his slaughter in the corresponding month of 1950.
Thus, if, at the end of April, total hog marketings for May, 1951,
were estimated to be 110 percent of the marketings for May, 1950,
each slaughterer's quota was 110 percent of his slaughter in May,
1950. Where marketings during the month were higher than estimated, the quota percentage was increased. There were additional
provisions limiting but not prohibiting entry into the business, and
providing for adjustment of quotas.
38. STUDIEs IN FOOD RATIONING, PART VI, LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER CONTROLS,
(Office of Temporary Controls 1947).
39. The slaughter quota system was embodied in Distribution Regulation 1, 16
FE. REG. 1273 (1951). DR 1 was issued not under the price control power granted
in Title IV of the Defense Production Act, but pursuant to the allocation authority
granted in § 101 of that Act, 64 STAT. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. §2071, Supp.
1952 which, with respect to food, was delegated by the President to the Secretary
of Agriculture, Executive Order 10161, 15 Fmn. REG. 6105 (1950), and in turn redelegated with respect to meat to the Administrator of the Economic Stabilization
Agency by Delegation of Authority with Respect to the Allocation of Meat, 16 Fa.
REG. 1272 (1951), and in turn redelegated to the Director of Price Stabilization by
ESA General Order 5, 16 FED. REG. 1273 (1951). See also, Delegation of Authority
with Respect to Meat, as amended, 16 Fan. REG. 11620 (1951), and ESA General
Order 5, Revision, 16 FaD. RE. 11875 (1951).
40. DR 1 was issued on February 9, 1950. The dollar and cents ceilings on
cattle (Ceiling Price Regulation 23), on beef sold at wholesale (Ceiling Price
Regulation 24), on beef sold at retail (Ceiling Price Regulations 25 and 26) were
not issued until April 30, 1951. 16 FaD. RaG. 3696, 3721, 3739, 3704 (1951).
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The slaughter quota system had a number of important advantages but the most important single one was in making the cattle ceilings more workable. There was a general conviction on the part of
those who had dealt with meat price control under OPA that the cattle
ceilings would not work without quotas. This conviction was due to
the peculiar nature of the cattle ceilings.
The worth of a beef animal depends on two things-its quality
(grade) and the amount of meat it will yield when slaughtered. However, there is no reliable way to determine the grade and yield of a
live animal. Grade and yield can only be determined after slaughter.
For that reason OPS did not place a ceiling on the individual animal.
The ceilings instead were limits on what a slaughterer might pay for
all cattle slaughtered during a month. The limits were determined in
accordance with a fairly complicated formula, the principal element
of which was the grade of the meat derived after slaughter. In effect
the price which could be paid for an animal was determined by its
worth after slaughter. Because this worth could not be determined
precisely for each individual animal or lot, it was necessary to put
the cattle ceilings on a monthly compliance basis so that a slaughterer
could average out his purchases over that period.
Because there was no ceiling on the individual animal there was
no ceiling on the seller. Also, because there was no ceiling on an individual animal, slaughterers might pay what they wanted for a lot
of cattle. They would still be in compliance with the regulation if their
purchases balanced out at the end of the month.
It is not practical under ceilings of this type to police individual
purchases since no individual purchase is a violation of the regulation.
Hence it was possible for one or more slaughterers to bid up the price
beyond compliance limits in a particular market and other slaughterers
had either to pay the price or withdraw from the bidding.
The quota system made the compliance ceilings workable by
operating as a limit on the volume of livestock for which any slaughterer
could bid and as an assurance to each slaughterer that he would obtain
his normal share of the total available supply without bidding up the
price.
Unfortunately the OPS had failed wholly to get this point across
when the Butler-Hope Amendment banning quotas had been under
consideration when the Defense Production Act was up for extension in
June and July. The quota system was defended primarily on the
ground that it was necessary to keep out potential black marketeers who
had invaded the business during OPA.4"
41. 97 Cong. Rec. 7464 (June 27, 1951).
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However, both the Senate and House, after debate characterized
by serious misunderstanding on both sides, adopted by overwhelming
votes the Butler-Hope Amendment banning quotas. OPS arguments
about the danger of an invasion of the business by black marketeers
were met by permitting continuation of the registration or licensing
program, although that was clearly not enough to prevent violations
of the cattle regulation and subsequent violations of the beef ceilings.
The adverse effect of the ban on slaughter quotas was felt in
the late summer and fall of 1951, when pressure on the cattle market
led to widespread evasion of cattle and beef ceilings and forced legitimate slaughterers to reduce their kill sharply because of inability to
get cattle at ceiling prices. During the fall of 1951 the pressure on
cattle ceilings became so heavy that the Office of Price Stabilization
was forced to relax the cattle ceilings for slaughterers whose kill was
substantially below normal.42 The alternative would have been to
force temporary shutdowns of some slaughtering establishments. To
halt the widespread violations of the cattle ceilings, it was necessary
also to concentrate a major part of the enforcement staff on the cattle
program.
The situation became so bad that serious consideration was given
within the Administration to abandoning the dollars-and-cents cattle
and beef ceilings. Largely because of the firmness under fire of Mr.
DiSalle, OPS was able to ride out the storm. A subsequent easing
of the pressure on cattle and beef ceilings has made the inability to
impose slaughter quotas academic in 1952.
The slaughter quota fight was lost largely because of the lack of
proper liaison between Congress and the OPS. It is true that the
cattle lobbies were very active in the fight on quotas. As in many
other cases where people are in a seller-buyer relationship, cattlemen
are suspicious of packers. Congressmen, particularly farm bloc Congressmen, share that suspicion. It is not surprising that some credence
was given to the cattlemen's charge that packers were using or could
use quotas to drive down cattle prices.
But the weight of the cattle lobby on the slaughter quota issue
was much less than its weight on an issue like the beef rollbacks, which
clearly and directly affected the producer's pocketbook. In this instance a very significant factor was the lack of confidence in OPS on
the part of Congress generally. This in turn was not attributable to
any particular hostility to the OPS personnel as such. Mr. DiSalle
was both respected and liked as a man of integrity, of moderation and
42. Amendment 2, 16 FED. REG. 9075 (1951)
10017 (1951) to Ceiling Price Regulation 23.

and Amendment 4, 16 FED.

REG.
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of practicality. There was nevertheless a Congressional suspicion of
bureaucrats and of bureaucratically imposed restraints on the free
market.
This suspicion was reinforced with respect to slaughter quotas by
the Congressional propensity to generalize from cases of alleged individual hardship presented by constituents. There were many complaints to Congressmen, in large measure unwarranted, about unfair
administration of the slaughter quota program. In the absence of continuous liaison between Congress and the OPS there was no opportunity
to dispel the Congressional hostility aroused by these complaints.
Had there been a system of continuous liaison between Congress,
through its Committees and the OPS, the need for quotas could have
been explained very persuasively to many Committee members at the
inception of the program. The prestige of the Committees in turn
might have been sufficient to save the program from the onslaughts of
its opponents on the floors of both Houses.
It is significant that those who dealt most directly with OPS
and who followed its activities most closely, the members of the two
Banking and Currency Committees, were in the majority in favor of
the slaughter quota program. The difficulty was that they were not
sufficiently familiar with the need for it to push the issue vigorously
when it came up on the floor. Better liaison with the Committees in
the actual formulation of policy might have resulted in this familiarity.
An effort to repeal or modify the Butler-Hope Amendment was
made in the fall of 1951. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee reported out favorably a provision restoring slaughter quota
authority but containing assurances that the authority could not be
used to limit marketings.'
This compromise had the active support
not only of the Democratic majority but also of the senior Republican
on the committee, Senator Capehart. However, the Committee was
unable to get the bill on the floor.
The Herlong Amendment.-The Herlong Amendment, § 402(k)
of the Defense Production Act, 44 provided in relevant part as follows:
43. The Butler-Hope modification was embodied in S. 2180, accompanied by
See also Hearings before the
Senate Co-mmittee on Banking and Currency on. S. 1928, S. 2092, and S. 2104, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
44. The amendment was added by section 104(h) of the Defense Production
Act Amendments of 1951, 65 STAT. 134. Several changes were made by section 110
of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 299, 50 U.S.C. APP.
§2102(k), the principal one being the deletion of the words "shall hereafter be
issued" and the substitution of the words "shall be issued or remain in effect." The
Herlong Amendment thus is now applicable to all OPS regulations, regardless of
when issued. However, the Cole Amendment giving each individual wholesaler and
retailer his customary markup, although passed by the House, 98 Cong. Rec. 8196,
(June 25, 1952) 8346 (June 26, 1952) was rejected by the Conference Committee,
H.R. REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1952).
SmT. REP. No. 840, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1951).
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"No rule, regulation, order or amendment thereto shall hereafter be issued under this title, which shall deny to sellers of
materials at retail or wholesale their customary percentage margins over costs of the materials during the period May 24, 1950,
to June 24, 1950, or on such other nearest representative date
determined under section 402(c)

.

In order to understand this provision, it is necessary to refer
briefly to the pre-Herlong OPS policy on distributors' margins. That
policy is perhaps best set forth in the Statement of Considerations for
Ceiling Price Regulations 14, 15 and 16, the regulations establishing
markups for wholesalers and retailers of dry groceries.4 5
The markups used were expressed in percentages. But although
percentage markups were used as a matter of technique, the standard
by which the validity of the markups could be tested was, according
to OPS, whether they yielded an amount equal to pre-Korean dollarsand-cents markups.
Again, in the case of automobiles OPS increased prices at the
manufacturing level, but permitted retailers to pass through only the
dollar and cent amount of the increase.4" This policy became one of
the major targets in the 1951 legislative battle. Retail representatives
attacked OPS for interfering with customary pricing practice in the
distributive trades.4'
The attack failed to impress either the Senate or House Committee. No provision on distributors' margins appeared in the bills sent
to the Senate and House floors.4" When, however, the extension legislation came up on the House floor, the House adopted an amendment
requiring OPS to give each individual distributor his customary percentage markup.49 There was no such provision in the bill passed by
the Senate and the issue came up in conference. The conference compromise was a substantial improvement over the House bill because
the requirement of giving each individual distributor his customary
markup was deleted. Customary percentage margins for a class of
45. 16 FED. REG. 2725 et seq. (1951).
46. Amendment 1 to Supplementary Regulation 5 to the General Ceiling Price
Regulation, 16 Fa. RFG. 2151 (1951).
47. See e.g., testimony of Rowland Jones, Jr., President of the American Retail
Federation, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 1397, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2019 et seq. (1951) and of Charles C. Freed of the
National Automobile Dealers Association, Id. at 2103 et seq.
48. The Senate Committee expressly took cognizance of the retailers' complaints
but refused to take statutory action to deal with them, confining itself to a statement
that OPS must consider increases in retailers' operating expenses in fixing margins.
SEN. REP. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951).
49. 97 Cong. Rec. 8740-5 (July 20, 1951).
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distributors were required instead to be given to each distributor in
the class.50
Apart altogether from its inflationary effect, the Herlong Amendment was based on oversimplified assumptions as to the facts. Customary percentage margins in the distribution trades, in the sense of
stated percentage margins (1) realized by most sellers in a particular
class and (2) realized over a period of time long enough to warrant
use of the word "customary," are largely a myth. The fact is that,
although many distributors, as a matter of pricing technique, establish
prices by adding a percentage markup to their cost of materials, the
amount of the markup very often varies substantially from distributor to distributor at any given time and varies substantially for any
given distributor from time to time.
Congress nevertheless adopted an amendment requiring OPS to
provide distributors with their customary percentage margins "during
the period May 24, 1950, to June 24, 1950." As applied to specific
states of fact, even the very language of the Herlong Amendment is
confusing. Most sellers do not have constant percentage margins over
long periods of time. Hence, the particular percentage margin which
happened to prevail "during the period May 24, 1950, to June 24,
1950" was not a customary percentage margin within the intent of the
law. Moreover, in many cases, the margin which was customary, that
is the margin which prevailed over a long period of time, was not a
percentage margin.
But even accepting the argument that there were customary percentage margins in the distribution trades and that those margins were
determinable, it is obvious that to require OPS to follow this custom
in a period of rising prices was inconsistent with effective price control. If, as was true in many cases, prices at the manufacturing or
processing level rose faster than operating expenses at the distribution
level, percentage margins were bound to provide much more than normal earnings.
Moreover, the Herlong Amendment required maintenance of percentage margins with a rising price level even though volume increases
were reducing unit operating expenses. Even dollar margins may be
inflationary in a period where sharp increases in volume may reduce
the unit cost of doing business very substantially. Percentage margins were obviously that much more inflationary.
The inflationary effects of the Herlong Amendment forecast by
OPS failed to materialize to the extent predicted for several reasons.
First, and most important, the burden of showing customary margins
50. H.R. REP. No. 770, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1951).
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was placed on sellers rather than OPS. Second, specific studies
showed that in some instances the customary margin pattern was dollars and cents rather than percentage margins. Third, in some cases
technical considerations dictated the use of percentage rather than
dollars and cents margins, and in other cases operating costs increased
at a rate which would have required the use of percentage margins as a
matter of fairness and equity, apart altogether from Herlong.
But, although the ultimate impact of the Herlong Amendment
has not been as grave as OPS at first believed, it has been serious
enough. To conform to the amendment, distributors' margins have
been increased in many cases beyond the level which would be required
to assure normal earnings. As a result, the cost of living has been
increased by more than would otherwise have been the case.
THE

1952

LEGISLATION

The 1951 legislative fight had been largely concerned with the
character of the controls which OPS might impose. The 1952 fight
centered on the question of whether controls were needed at all.5 1
The ambiguous economic situation did not present a clear-cut case
for continuance of controls. On the other hand, it was clearly the
part of prudence not to scrap controls hastily in a period when they
might be needed badly as a result of an unfavorable turn in the international situation and when they were clearly doing some good in some
areas, most notably in the field of items needed for the procurement
program.
In a general sense, the 1952 fight over extension and amendment
of the price control provisions of the Defense Production Act in 1952
presented the question of whether widespread regulation of the economy is justified under the economic conditions prevailing in 1952.
Where the danger of overpowering inflation was clear, Congress had
not hesitated to authorize sweeping direct controls to stabilize the level
of prices, wages and rents. It did so during World War II. It enacted comprehensive legislation providing for similar controls in September 1950, within three months of the outbreak of the Korean War,
when the dangers of inflation were clear even though the Administration itself had not yet requested price control authority.
51. Renewed efforts to get the Capehart, Herlong and Butler-Hope Amendments
repealed or changed were made in 1952. Message from the President of the United
States, H.R. Doc. No. 347, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952). However by that time,
the economic situation had changed drastically. The case for repeal or modification
of the amendments was just as strong in terms of price control policy but it was
not as urgent as a practical matter. As a result these amendments were not a
serious issue during the consideration of the 1952 legislation.
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In 1952, however, the economic situation was ambiguous. True,
the underlying ingredients of inflation were still present. On March
31, 1952, the gigantic post-Korea defense program was only one-quarter completed. Expenditures for national security were increasing and
were taking a larger share of the annual output.5 2 Liquid savings were
at a record high. A sudden release of these savings in the market
place and another panic buying spree, which could be caused by new
international developments, would generate terrific pressure on prices.
The Consumer Price Index had reached near record highs, increasing
almost 14 percent since Korea. In many important areas, prices were
pushing the ceiling and, if price stabilization were abolished, would
rise even more. This was particularly true in the heavy industry areas
related to the defense program. But it was also true of other commodities, including such basic foods as milk and bread. Finally, a
turn for the worse in the international situation could easily lead to
scare buying, shortages, and rapidly rising prices.
There was another side of the picture. Even the staunchest advocate of direct price control would concede that it should be used only
as a last resort. In many areas, sensitive marketing mechanisms do
not lend themselves readily to the arbitrary flat-footed techniques of
price control. Over the long run, the proper level of prices cannot be
determined on the basis of the judgment of price administrators no
matter how objective or competent. Moreover, even setting aside
these more serious considerations, price control means red tape for
businessmen, discriminates against small sellers who are unable to understand or take full advantage of the regulatory mechanism, and
causes understandable and mounting irritation by businessmen who
are prevented from doing what they want by government regulation.
Congress has always been sensitive to the underlying dangers of longrun price control. Moreover, because of the pressure of its constituents, it has become almost over-aware of the irritations and red tape
that are inevitable under price control no matter how well administered.
The proponents of price control, therefore, have to overcome the
presumption that price controls are undesirable by showing that they
are clearly necessary. In 1952 this showing was difficult to make. While
52. Before Korea, national security expenditures were at an annual rate of less
than 17 billion dollars-about 6 percent of the national output. In the first quarter
of 1952, security expenditures had climbed to a rate of about 47 billion dollars, or
nearly 14 per cent of the national output. It was expected that by sometime in 1953,
this security expenditure rate would increase to some 65 billions-about 18 per cent
of the annual output. Thus, while the price control legislation was under consideration, it was expected that the impact of an increase of 15 or 20 billion dollars in annual security expenditures was still to hit the economy.
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the general ingredients of inflation were present, while prices were
high, and while in many areas prices were pressing ceilings, there were
on the other hand widespread indications that in some areas price controls were not necessary. Particularly in durable and soft goods there
was evidence that many major commodities were selling below ceiling
and that the inflationary pressures would not push up prices. In these
areas, Congress was faced with the paradox that while purchasing
power was at an all-time high and while the cost pressures that lead
to inflation were increasingly insistent, consumer demand had slackened. There was substantial evidence that no matter whether price
controls were to continue, prices in these areas would not increase.
The OPS itself had recognized this fact, had established standards
for suspension of controls in these soft market areas, and had suspended
controls in significant areas.
In the background was the disastrous steel controversy. The
House and the Senate Banking and Currency Committees held extensive investigations of this controversy while they were considering extension of the law. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this article to
discuss the merits of that controversy. There can be no question, however, that a large number of Congressmen felt that the Wage Stabilization Board had granted the steel workers an amount in excess of that
to which they were entitled under sound stabilization standards, and
that the price control standards of the Office of Price Stabilization in
dealing with steel were too rigid. Those accepting this sentiment felt
either that the administration of controls was so unfair that they should
not be continued in a situation where the need for them was not clear
or that the pressure which was generated by an over-generous wage
stabilization policy made price control ineffectual. Most Congressmen, even those who shared these sentiments, were not inclined however to take the chance that prices would not go up if controls were
lifted. But, the feelings aroused by the steel case were partially responsible for the resentment shown by the House of Representatives
in passing a price control bill which contained such substantial amendments as to be worthless.
On balance, however, Congress decided to retain controls, primarily because it felt that it could not take a chance when the underlying
factors leading to inflation were still present and when the international situation was still so turbulent. But in doing so, it passed a
series of amendments limiting the authority of the Office of Price
Stabilization, and indicated its clear desire that in those areas where
the facts did not warrant control the OPS was to suspend those controls.
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The ultimate approach of Congress was, on the whole, statesmanlike. It recognized that controls might well be needed in the future.
It also recognized that automatic decontrol and suspension formulas
would not work, and so attempts to write these into the law did not
succeed. But it is not unfair to say that this approach succeeded because of the leadership of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
in the Senate and of the ability of that leadership to make its views
prevail in conference.
Despite the fact that its Banking and Currency Committee reported out a workable bill, the House action on price controls was to
preserve the form of controls but not the substance. To strike down
controls entirely, although it might have been wrong, was at least a
consistent and tenable approach. To establish controls on a standby
basis was also a possible approach. To strengthen and extend the
price control authority, even if an arguable course of action, was at
least a rational one. But to pass a completely gutted price control bill
was certainly not a reasonable discharge of legislative responsibilities.
The Harrison Amendment.-By far the most important of the
changes made in the 1952 bill was the Harrison Amendment, which
prohibits price control on fruits and vegetables in fresh or processed
form.

53

This provision arose in the first instance in the fight over potato
price control. As adopted on the Senate floor and in the House Banking and Currency Committee, it prohibited price control on fresh fruits
and vegetables.5 4 However the amendment was extended to processed
fruits and vegetables by action of the House accepted by the Senate
conferees.55 In decontrolling fresh fruits and vegetables, Congress had
exempted from price ceilings items accounting for approximately 10
percent of the food dollar. Processed fruits and vegetables (canned,
frozen, etc.) accounted for another 11 percent.
Moreover, although arguments could be made as to the difficulties of controlling the prices of fresh fruits and vegetables, regulation
of the canning industry and of the distributive levels beyond the canning industry was relatively easy. The regulations applicable to canned
and frozen fruits and vegetables were generally workable and fair.
What the canning industry actually sought, and what it could prob53. The Harrison Amendment provides that "No ceiling shall be established or
maintained under this title for fruits or vegetables in fresh or processed form." It
was added to § 402(d) (3) of the Defense Production Act by § 106(b) of the Defense
Production Act Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 298 (1952).
54. 98 CoNG. REc. 6672-4 (June 4, 1952); H.R. 8210, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 104(b) (1952).
55. 98 Cong. Rec. 7867-72 (June 20, 1952).
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ably have expected, was suspension in those areas where supplies had
been so great as to bring prices down substantially below the ceiling.
Farmers get only about 20 percent of the retail prices of canned
fruits and vegetables. Hence the major effect of the Harrison Amendment as applied to canned items was to decontrol the 80 percent of the
retail price accounted for by canners' and retailers' margins. This fact,
as well as the unfortunate consequences of decontrol of such important
cost of living items if there were ever a return of acute inflationary
pressure, should have been enough to defeat the amendment.
A brief word on the manner in which the legislation was adopted
is again in order. That part of the Harrison Amendment which exempted fruits and vegetables in processed form, was never presented
to either of the Banking and Currency Committees. There was of
course no committee action on the suggestion and the debate on the
House floor was in generalities. Once again Congress acted without
the benefits of the consideration and advice of its own committees.
The Bricker and Rains Amendments.-Further steps to whittle
away controls were taken in the Bricker and Rains Amendments.
The Bricker Amendment provides as follows:
"(1) No rule, regulation, order, or amendment thereto
issued under this title shall fix a ceiling on the price paid or received on the sale or delivery of any material in any State below
the minimum sales price of such material fixed by the State law
(other than any so-called 'fair trade law') now in effect, or by
regulation issued pursuant to such law." 6
OPS was thus required to adjust its ceilings to conform to state minimum price laws. In some situations OPS had done so as a matter of
discretion. But it is another thing entirely to require OPS to defer to
state minimums as a matter of law. The urgent need to control inflation obviously should be the overriding consideration in any determination as to whether federal or state policy should be decisive in determining prices..
The Rains Amendment" 7 forbids the establishment of ceilings
below the state minimurm price for milk; and if the state fixes a maximum price for milk, the ceiling must be equal to the maximum. State
minimum milk price regulation is designed primarily to protect pro56. The amendment was added by section 111 of the Defense Production Act
Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 300 (1952).
See SEx. REP. No. 1599, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 26-7 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 2177, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1952); H.R.
REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).
57. The amendment was added to § 402(d) (3) of the Defense Production Act
by § 106(b) of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 298
(1952). See H.R. REP. No. 2177, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1952).
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ducers and as a result state boards dealing with milk have not been
primarily consumer-minded. This is not a criticism but a fact. The
likelihood is that consumers will not fare as well under state minimum
milk price regulation as they would under price ceilings established by
an agency whose primary responsibility is to protect consumers. On
the other hand there could be no serious argument that either the
Bricker or the Rains Amendment was necessary to protect sellers,
since the Defense Production Act, itself, contains adequate safeguards
to this effect.
The Wolcott Amendment.-Finally, the difficulty experienced by
Congress in dealing with a technical subject is illustrated by the Wolcott Amendment modifying the review provisions of the Emergency
Court of Appeals. n8 This court, created pursuant to the Defense Production Act, has been assigned exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
validity of price control regulations.
Section 408(b) of the Act formerly provided in part that:
"No such regulation or order shall be enjoined or set aside,
in whole or in part, unless the complainant establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the regulation or order is not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious."
The Wolcott Amendment, as introduced in the House, deleted
this provision and substituted a preponderance of evidence rule as the
standard for judicial review. This amendment never was considered
by either of the Committees. It was offered on the floor by Mr. Wolcott, senior Republican on the House Committee, and accepted by Mr.
Spence, Chairman of the Committee, as merely subjecting the Office
of Price Stabilization to the same standard of judicial review as other
administrative agencies. 59
It is obvious that both Mr. Wolcott and Mr. Spence were under
a misapprehension on this score. "Substantial evidence," rather than
a preponderance of the evidence, has been the conventional test of judicial review, and that test is now embodied in section 10(e) of the AdNevertheless, with the agreement of
ministrative Procedure Act.'
these two leading members of the House Banking and Currency Committee, the amendment went through on a voice vote.
The amendment was actually a complete rewrite of the provisions
defining the jurisdiction of the Emergency Court. The Court was for
58. The Wolcott Amendment is a complete rewrite of the former provisions
of section 408 of the Defense Production Act relating to court review, 64 STAT. 808,
(1950) 50 U.S.C. App. § 2108 (Supp. 1952). The amendment was added by section
113(b) of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 302 (1952).
59. 98 CONG. REc. 7865-6 (June 20, 1952).
60. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1946).
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the first time granted power to enjoin temporarily enforcement of a
price regulation. Moreover, the automatic stay of the court's decisions pending determination by the Supreme Court was deleted. These
changes made by the Wolcott Amendment were not even referred to in
the debates, and it is doubtful that any member who voted for the bill
was aware of the changes or their significance.
The conferees modified the Wolcott Amendment by substituting
for the preponderance of evidence rule the Administrative Procedure
Act test of substantial evidence."' However, the other changes made
by the Wolcott Amendment were retained. Fortunately, the subsequent legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Emergency Court of Appeals to use its injunction power sparingly; 62 and in
its first and only decision under the new statute, the court has indicated clearly that it will comply with this intent.6 3
The lesson to be drawn from the enactment of the Wolcott
Amendment is the manner in which legislative changes of an important but technical character can slide through on the floor without
proper consideration. The merits of the changes made by the Wolcott
Amendment obviously warranted considerably more study than the
members of Congress either on the House floor or in the Conference
Committee were able to give it.
The Danger of Creeping Inflatio.-The law as passed by Congress was as good as could be expected in the political and economic
climate existing in the summer of 1952. The very fact of its extension
gives consumers a feeling that there is some protection against soaring
prices. This psychological safeguard may prevent some scare buying
which would in itself build up inflationary pressures. But the cumulative effect of the many amendments was such that the law, as extended,
afforded only limited protection against inflationary price increases. It
was a law designed to make price control painless to the farmer, to the
manufacturer, and to the retailer. Indeed, large numbers of sellers were
exempted entirely from its provisions. It is better than no law and in
some areas it can protect consumers, farmers, and the Government
against price increases. Its anti-rollback provisions, its cost-plus provisions, and its markup provisions, while making price controls more
palatable to sellers, spread dangerously thin the protection to consumers. During a period of inflation organized groups whose goods or
services are in demand can pretty well take care of themselves. The
61. Section 408, as amended, 66 STAT. 302 (1952).
62. H.R. REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-5 (1952); 98 CoNqG. REC. 8593
(June 28, 1952).
63. Wing v. Arnall, 198 F.2d 571 (Em. Ct. App. 1952).

368

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

larger manufacturer, organized labor, and most farmers will be able
to take care of themselves in a semi-inflationary economy. It is the
unorganized white collar worker and the person living on fixed income who are the forgotten men of this law.
If this were a period of full-blown inflation, consumer outcries
could be counted upon to produce a stronger law. But this is a garter
snake kind of inflation-creeping and spotted. Creeping inflation is
just as harmful and more insidious than full inflation. If prices increase at the rate of four percent a year, a retired worker on a fixed
income is just as badly off at the end of two years as he would be at
the end of one year if prices increased eight percent a year. The difference is that in the period of creeping inflation, Congress is reluctant to afford the full protection that is demanded when full inflation exists.
Because inflationary pressures are spotty, those charged with administering controls face another dilemma. There can be no question
that in the consumer soft and durable goods area there is sufficient market softness so that widespread suspension of controls is likely. This
in itself does not hurt the consumer because these items are not selling
at ceiling prices anyway. The difficulty is, however, that with substantial areas not under price control, it may be a psychological and political impossibility to impose tight price control standards on those
areas which remain under control. And so today those on fixed incomes or those workers, particularly white collar workers, whose bargaining position is relatively weak, face a slow decline in real income
over a substantial period of time. A large part of the American middleclass, which has been the major source of political stability, is being
ground between the millstones of relatively fixed incomes and slowly
rising living costs. The existing price control law will afford some
protection and will delay some price increases, but it is not strong
enough to resist creeping inflation.
IMPROVEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

The problems presented by the 1952 extension of price control,
however, go farther than merely a question of the extent to which a
government should direct the economic life of the country in times
of inflation. It presented also the problem of proper relationship of
the legislature to the executive in administering price control, and the
proper procedures to be followed within Congress itself in order to
achieve intelligent legislation in a complex economic field like price
control.
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The problem has been subject to continuous and active study,
particularly in the last twenty years, not only by political scientists but
also by thoughtful members of Congress and by Congressional committees.6 The 79th Congress appointed a Joint Committee on the
Reorganization of Congress headed by Senator LaFollette, which conducted extensive hearings and made thirty-seven recommendations on
changes in organization and procedure. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 194685 enacted some but by no means all of these changes
into law. It did improve the committee structure, committee procedures, and the technical facilities available to Congress. It failed to
enact those recommendations which would have provided more responsible party government in Congress, closer liaison between the
House and the Senate, and closer legislative-executive liaison.
Regular Committee Review.-It frequently has been proposed
that committees subject the administrative agencies under their jurisdiction to frequent, periodic and systematic review. 6 Hearings would
be held at frequent and regular intervals. Administrators not only
would report on their activities but also would discuss with the committee major policy matters involving both past and prospective problems. There would be a regular question period when the committee
members could explore grievances caused by agency action and probe
into administration operations. The hearings would be supplemented
by day-by-day staff liaison between the committee and the agency staff
and by full written reports by the agency to the committee. This proposal was made by the LaFollette Committee,67 but only partially
adopted in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.6" It is particularly effective if supplemented by an agency office manned by a top
agency official on Capitol Hill.69
On the whole, Congressional committees do not fully employ these
useful tools. 0 In many cases, hearings are held only when Congres64. Particularly Senators Kefauver and LaFollette. See KEFAUVER & LmvrN,
A TWENTIETH CENTURY CONGRESS (1947).
65. 60 STAT. 812 (1946). See GALLowAY, CONGRESS AT THE CROSSROADS 340-346

(1946).

66. See KEFAUVER AND LEvIN, op. cit. supra, note 64, at 147-148. See also the
discussion of the Smith Committee in Perkins, American Governmnent and Politics:
Congressional Self-Improvement, 38 Am. PoL Sci. REv. 504-5 (1944).
67. SEN. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1946).
68. Section 136 provides that the appropriate committee shall exercise "continuous watchfulness" over the activities of administrative agencies subject to their
jurisdiction and shall study the agency reports. 60 STAT. 832 (1946).
69. KEFAUVER AND LEWN, op. cit. supra note 64 at 149-150.
70. See Galloway, The Operation of the Legislative Reorganizatio= Act of 1946,
45 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 41 (1951).
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sional grievances against agency conduct have accumulated into substantial irritation, or when some major crisis has arisen. In crisis
hearings, administrators armed for battle feel obliged to defend themselves at all cost from Congressional onslaught. Expert testimony is
used to build a defensive wall of rationalization of all administrative
actions. Mutual irritation prevents an objective presentation or an
7
objective appraisal of agency acts. 1

The key to effective Congressional review is in the more widespread adoption of regular review procedures."2 It is obvious that
these procedures lead to a better-informed Congress and to better personal relations. There are other substantial advantages. First, the
questioning of agency officials is an effective safety valve against a
Congressional blow-up because it gets problems resolved that otherwise would irritate over an extended period of time. Not only do
Congressmen get things off their chest but the agency learns what is
bothering Congress and can take action before minor irritations balloon
into major problems. Second, hearings are held in a businesslike way
in a calm atmosphere, which contrasts with the heated atmosphere
characteristic when hearings are held only on occasions when a crisis
has aroused Congressional tempers."8 Third, much of the discussion
can center on prospective rather than past policy. Not only will this
mean that Congress is better informed on the reasons for agency action,
but, to the extent that the committee shares in the responsibility of
major policy decisions, it will be less prone to destructive or uninformed
criticism. If, for example, the Committee had participated in the roll71. "In June 1945, speaking almost plaintively before the reorganization group,
Mr. Bowles, said: 'All too frequently the only contact between agency heads and
members of Congress occurs on critical issues which must be dealt with. As a result,
the top men in the executive branches of the Government often dread their contact
with the legislators. Instead of a free-working relationship of intelligent people, all
seeking the same general end, the contacts often are held in an atmosphere of
suspicion, charges and misunderstanding."' KEZAUvER & LEviN, op. cit. .rpra
note 64, at 148.
72. "Informal conferences at the committee and/or staff level with agency officials
is another method which has proved helpful in performing the oversight function.
First used by Chairman Lanham and Administrator Blanford on national Housing
matters, this method had helped resolve complaints and misunderstandings, made for
closer cooperation, and laid a foundation of mutual respect and confidence. During
the second session of the 80th Congress, the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce held a series of such meetings with representatives of 14 regulatory agencies in its field. The committee stated that these meetings enabled it to
exercise closer supervision over these agencies; that they were a means of acquainting the new members of the committee with the activities with which they would become concerned; and that they provided a channel for the various agencies to present
their ideas to the committee concerning possible measures for improving their work
or making it more effective." Galloway, smpra note 70, at 61.
73. "Discussions relate not so much to policy or program as to administrative
details which excite suspicion, irritation, and strain on both sides. Conferences at
times when legislators were not after specific things which their constituents want
would result 'in common ground, common purpose, and mutual respect."' APPLEBY,
BIG DamocRAcy 159 (1945).
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back decisions of OPS, it might have had a fuller appreciation of their
necessity. Fourth, administrative expertness will tend to be accompanied by administrative candor in discussing policies and in presenting
factual considerations. Congressional committees will thus have at
their disposal the technical expertness and experience accumulated from
operations that can be found only in the executive. Finally, the committee will be better prepared to present the case against crippling
amendments offered in floor debate by legislators who are not committee members.
Generally the Banking and Currency Committees plus the Joint
Committee on Defense Production have employed some but not all
of these techniques. The Committees worked diligently, received frequent reports from responsible agencies, and explored the vital issues
before the agencies. On the other hand, the Committees conceived
their functions as one of critical review of actions already taken. There
was no regular reporting by agency officials on prospective as well as
past policy. Many hearings, such as those conducted on the beef rollback and on the steel strike, were held in a crisis atmosphere. While
the Committees had a responsibility to hear criticisms of the agencies, a
disproportionate amount of their time was spent in hearing repetitious
and lengthy criticism from industry witnesses. This course of action
was particularly unfortunate because the scarcest commodity on Capitol
Hill is time. The Committees had so many other responsibilities that
they did not have time to explore fully many of the issues on which
they acted.
Nevertheless it can be said generally that if Congress had relied
on its Committees more heavily, there would be a better price control
law today. The only major amendments recommended by the Committees were the Fugate and Bricker Amendments and the anti-rollback provision of the Capehart Amendment The third sentence of
the Capehart Amendment was drafted by the Conference but both
Committees in the fall of 1951 reported out new legislation repealing or
substantially modifying it. The Herlong, Harrison, Wolcott and Butler-Hope amendments were floor amendments.
Improvement of Staff Facilities.-The effectiveness of the review
depends upon the quality of the staff and the committee procedures.
In turn the effectiveness of the staff depends upon attaining the personal
confidence of the Committee, and particularly the Committee chairman.
Certainly Congress needs more of a staff than it now has. Pursuant
to the recommendations of the LaFollette Committee, Congress in
passing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 took a long step
forward in providing an adequate staff to do the job. Moreover, many
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of the staffs, such as those of the Committees concerned with price control, are of high quality. Yet, Congressional staffs are spread far too
thin to give Congress the kind of technical advice it really needs.
While more staff is needed, the building of a large staff of experts in
the Congress is certainly not the sole answer to the problem.
The
legislature could not hope to match the expertness of the agency because it would have neither as large a staff nor the invaluable background of operating experience. The effort should be to develop a
staff of sufficient size and competence to understand the major technical problems and to help the committee in its deliberations on them.
To go further is not only needlessly expensive but "the inevitable conflicts among experts will sharpen the differences between administrative
and legislative branches, raising their disagreements to a higher plane
by reinforcing their predilections with statistics." "
Improvement of Committee Procedures.--The effectiveness of
committee procedures depends upon the personality of the chairman,
the composition of the committee and the competence of the staff.
There is much that the staff, backed by the committee chairman, can
do to make hearings more pointed and effective.75 By briefing of the
committee on the issues in executive session in advance of hearing,
by the grouping of witnesses so their testimony is focused on certain
issues, by the briefing of witnesses' statements in advance of hearing
for use of the committee members, and by preparing questions for use
of members, the staff can make the hearings more meaningful. With
the support of the chairman, the staff can cut down materially on the
number of witnesses and avoid repetitious testimony. Moreover, the
committee consideration of legislation in executive session can be
helped by prepared summaries of issues and testimony. All of these
techniques were employed in some degree by the committee staff working on price control. That they were not more fully employed was due
not to lack of staff understanding of their effectiveness, but to the fact
that committee members were so busy that briefing time was limited and
the staff too small to handle all the problems presented.
Provisional Regulations.-It also has been proposed that Congressional review would be strengthened if the regulations of the
agency were made provisional while filed with an appropriate committee. If the committee did not disapprove of the regulations within
74. Perkins, Ainericc n Government and Politics, 38 Am. PoI Sci. REv. 500,
508 (1944).
75. For a discussion of methods of improving committee procedures, see GALLoWAY, op. cit. supra note 65, at 182-184.
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a stipulated time, of ten or fifteen days, they would become effective.76
There can be no question that this proposal would strengthen the supervision of Congress; as an attempt to obtain an advance joint responsibility for policy action, it has considerable merit. While the British
have had some success with the provisional order system, Parliament,
as a whole, not just a committee, must disapprove and irresponsible
action is prevented by a party discipline which is not present in Congress.
If only regulations involving major policy were submitted, the
proposal might succeed. However, no practical distinction could be
drawn between important regulations requiring Congressional approval, and unimportant ones which would go into effect immediately.
A Congressman would consider any regulation important that affected
a vocal constituent. For this reason, the cure is worse than the disease. Congressmen would be bogged down with decisions on hundreds
of regulations and harassed by pressure from affected groups to intervene. The OPS, in a year and a half, issued 153 major regulations and 864 amendments or supplements, some of which also involved
important policy matters and most of which vitally affected some industry which would be interested in Congressional intervention. Important Congressional work would be impaired and the activities of
administrative agencies would be bogged down by endless Congressional controversy. A widespread use of the legislative veto would
stop urgently needed action by the agency and prevent the development
of any affirmative agency program. Congressional review would be
directed toward countless small matters to the neglect of large policy
matters.
Improvement of Floor Procedure.-Most of the improvement in
floor procedure is not a matter of mechanics but a matter of improvement of party responsibility in Congress.7 There is, however, one
76. See

KEFAUWvR

& LEVIN, op. cit. muprca note 64, at 151; LANDIS, THE ADpra note 13, at 166-

PRocEss 77-80 (1938); HYNEZAN, op. ci.
174; YOUNG, THIS Is CONGRESS 209-215 (1946).

MINISTRATIVE

77. Perhaps the oldest and most persistent suggestion to improve floor procedure
is that Congress institute a regular question period of administrative officials on the
floor of Congress similar to that successfully employed by the British Parliament.
In England, this has served not only to inform the Parliament and improve the
executive agencies by keeping the Minister on his toes, but has been an effective
safety valve for letting off Parliamentary irritation. There has been strong opposition to the use of the question period in Congress. The opponents argue that it would
be an impairment of the doctrine of separation of powers and that in the absence of
the British Parliamentary system, with strong party discipline and a ministry composed of members of and responsible to Parliament, it would lead to most partisan
and irresponsible discussion. While this suggestion is not likely to be adopted in the
near future, it is likely that question periods will be used more extensively in the
committees, rather than on the floor of Congress. See FINLETTER, CAN RPRESENTA-
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device that could be employed. In some instances Congress has recognized the danger of amendments to bills with a broad economic impact and of a technical nature where seemingly innocuous amendments
can destroy the purposes of the bill. Thus, tax legislation is generally
considered in the House of Representatives under a closed rule permitting introduction of amendments only by members of the committee
with consent of the majority of the committee. No such rule and no
such agreement prevailed in the consideration of the price control measure. Gag rule which takes authority away from the Congress as a
whole and inhibits full discussion on the floor certainly has to be
justified by extreme necessity. Moreover, since the Rules Committee
determines whether a closed rule will be employed, it may be in a position to control the substance of the legislation introduced. If, however,
the rules function were performed by a party policy committee, the
closed rule could be employed in limited instances to strengthen party
responsibility and to protect legislation from technical amendments on
the floor.

78

Legislative-Executive Cooperation Backed by Party Responsibility.-More significant than any improvement in mechanics are the
underlying questions of the proper relationship between the executive
and the legislature and the related problem of the role of the party in
American politics. 79 It is not suggested that the executive should set
the policy and the Congressional leaders blindly follow it. The policy
must be set by joint council of the Congressional and administration
leaders and then supported by both." No such council would be of
any great effectiveness unless it were backed by party responsibility
= GOVERNMENT Do THE JOB? 87-8 (1945) ; KEFAuVER AND LEVIN, op. cit. supra
note 64, at 70; GALLOWAY, op. cit. supra note 65, at 215-219. But see TRUMAN,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 530-531.
78. The British Parliament uses procedures which insure that technical amendments are sound and will not interfere with the objectives of the Act. The bill is
passed by the House in principle only and on the second reading is referred to the
standing committee. This committee has the obligation to perfect the bill technically,
but it must act within the principle of the bill. The committee does not hear witnesses, but obtains the technical information from the responsible minister and the
civil service. Thus the technical features of the bill are based upon the professional
and technical expertness of the responsible civil servants, and cannot conflict with
the objectives of the bill itself. See Finer, The British System, 18 U. OF CH. L.
REv. 521 (1951).
79. The problem has occupied political scientists for a generation. Literally
hundreds of proposals have been made cumulating in the four-year study and report
of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association,
Towards a More Responsible Two Party System, 44 Am. PoL Sc. REV., Supp.
(1950). See also testimony of Mr. Bertram M. Gross, representing the Association. Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department
on Evaluation of the Effects of Laws enacted to Reorganize the Legislative Branch,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) p. 271.
80. See FINLETTER, op. cit. supra note 77, at 155-158, and HYNEMAN, op. Cit.
supra note 13, at 571-572.
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within the Congress itself. It is for these reasons that the effective
use of majority policy committees in both houses is important. There
are committees today that have similar titles, but they are not effective."1 The important thing is how much attention is paid to their
decisions.
There can be no question of the theoretical advantages of a joint
executive-legislative council backed by party responsibility. When the
legislators of the party in power and the executive are working together, the legislature participates in the formulation of policy and the
technical resources of the executive are available to keep him informed
on the more detailed side. When legislative leaders participate in the
making of policy decisions, they accept the responsibility for obtaining
Congressional support. This means that policies once agreed upon,
have a greater chance of legislative acceptance.1 2 As party responsibility increases, government is made more effective. 8 Legislation will
81. These committees have not been successful in establishing party discipline.
Dr. Galloway has summarized their effectiveness as follows: "As devices for coordinating legislative policy-making and strengthening party leadership, the Senate
policy committees have thus far failed to achieve their full potential. As instruments
for promoting more effective liaison and cooperation with the President, they have
also been a disappointment, partly because of the lack of similar party policy committees in the House of Representatives. Their limited achievements to date can
be attributed, I suggest, to their composition, to the fragmentation of power in
Congress and to the deep internal divisions within both of our major political parties."
Galloway, supra note 70, at 51-52.
82. "These recommendations were based on the theory that in a democracy
national problems must be handled on a national basis. Only thro'ugh the expression
of the will of the people by their support of political parties on the basis of their
platform pledges can the majority will be determined ...
"Your committee recognizes the need for freedom of action on the part of the
individual Member of Congress and his right to vote at any time against the announced policy of his party. But we feel that if party accountability for policies
and pledges is to be achieved, stronger and more formal mechanisms are necessary...
"Improved understanding of each other's problems will be promoted by consultation before legislation is introduced to carry out pledged party promises and on
matters of high administration policy. By giving congressional leaders a part in the
formulation of policy, instead of calling upon them to enact programs prepared with"
SEN. REP. No.
out their participation, better cooperation can be obtained ...
1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1946).
83. The English system demonstrates that criticism is not destroyed when the
executive and the legislative work together in dealing with complex problems.
There, of course, the ministers are the leaders of the party in Parliament itself. The
result is that a government bill is not only supported by the executive and the legislative, but it is drafted and presented by them. The Government has at its disposal,
as does the Parliament, all the resources of the civil service. They have available to
them all the knowledge and experience and insight into the problems that have been
accumulated through the years of dealing in them. Yet despite this integration of the
executive and the legislative no one who reads proceedings of Parliament can believe that it is less alert of the dangers of arbitrary and unfair administrative action
than is the Congress of the United States. Indeed, through the device of daily question periods, debates on matters of definite and urgent public importance, and debates
on motions for adjournment. Parliament is not only alertly critical, but is able to
quickly and effectively question deficiencies in administrative action and take corrective action. Finer, supra note 78, at 521.
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more often be based upon the national interests as conceived by the
joint legislative-executive council and less often upon the demands of
minority interest groups. While national pressure groups representing
farmers, labor and business interests may influence national policy,
their influence would be limited to major policy matters which would
be the subject of full debate. Party responsibility will help prevent
emasculation of legislation by floor amendments. It will tend to concentrate debate on major differences in policy between the parties.
Democracy would not only be more competent, but more responsive.
In the long run, the ability of a responsible democratic legislature
to deal with complex problems, to delegate authority, and to control
and review that delegation, depends more on the resolution of these
two basic problems than on any question of procedures within the
executive or within the legislature. It is well to recognize, however,
that complete legislative-executive cooperation and complete party discipline are neither necessary nor desirable in this country. The dominant fact in American politics is that this is a big country with many
divergent local interests. It is not homogeneous like England. As
long as the President is elected as predominantly a national representative and legislators as predominantly local representatives, there is
bound to be conflict. Nor can there be party discipline based upon a
strict national policy. National policy must be reconciled with local
interests. Each region must be convinced that the over-all national
policy is fair to it. Congressmen representing local interests cannot
be expected to ignore those interests when they conflict with party
policy based more on national considerations.
Even if the difficulties are recognized, there is much that can be
done to improve both executive-legislative relationships and party responsibility. The existence of a joint council and party policy committee will establish a machine to iron out differences and to forge a
national policy which will be reconciled as far as possible with local
interests. Not only would compromise decisions be more acceptable
to divergent interests, but the majority policy committee could be
backed by many recognized techniques of party control. The greater
use of party caucuses, the control of patronage and committee assignments, the assignment to the committee of the steering functions now
held by the Rules Committee, and the financing of Congressional campaigns by the party, 4 would all increase the influence of the joint council and the majority policy committee.
Existing political procedures are strongly entrenched, not only in
the habits of Congressmen and administrators, but in the political fabric
84. See note 18 supra.
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of the country as a whole. There will be no quick change or rapid
improvement. But the history of Congressional procedures since 1945
is a clear indication that a slow but sure improvement is under way and
that small changes and new techniques add up to an impressive total
of improvement. It is well for democracy that it does. It is not only
good government that depends on a solution to this problem. The
ability of Congress to deal with highly complex problems is in a large
sense the measure of the ability of the nation to deal with them. And,
to the degree that Congress is successful, democracy is successful in
showing that a policy forged by the democratic process can meet the
technical necessities of a complex age.

